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ABSTRACT. A U.S.-Canada Arctic Policy Forum, funded by the William H. Donner Foundation, Inc., New York, met to consider the need for 
U.S.-Canadian cooperation in the Arctic and some of the barriers thereto. The  U.S. co-chair assessed the causes of conflict between the two countries, 
the need for cooperation and some of the sources of each side’s conduct and indicated how the delegates- speaking in their capacities as private citizens 
- worked their way through the issues to the forum’s conclusion. Sovereignty questions dominated the conflict issues. But each side had four types of 
similar internal problems in making arctic policy: 1) native vs. nonnative interests; 2) regional vs. central interests; 3) public vs. private interests; and 4) 
oil development vs. subsistence and commercial fishing and hunting interests. The forum concluded with suggestions that future meetings use the 
Canadian Federal Assessment Panel’s (or Tener) report as a source of examining possible U.S.-Canadian cooperative measures in the Beaufort Sea 
region and the Canada-Denmark Agreement as a possible “model”  for U.S.-Canadian environmental cooperation in the Arctic. 
Key words: sovereignty, Northwest Passage, indigenous rights, oil and gas, security, Tener Report, arctic industrialization, scientific cooperation, 
Beaufort Sea, marine resources 
RÉSUMÉ. Un Forum sur la politique arctique canado-americaine, financé par la William H. Donner Foundation, Inc.,  de New York, fut tenu afin 
d’envisager la nécessité de la coopération du Canada et des Etats-Unis dans l’Arctique âinsi que les obstacles attenants. Le Co-président américain évalua 
les causes de conflits entre les deux pays, la nécessité de la coopération, et certaines des sources régissant la conduite des deux parties, et signala la façon 
dont les délégués traitèrent des questions à travers le Forum, prononçant leurs opinions à titre de simples citoyens. Les questions de souveraineté 
dominkrent les matikres de conflit. Chaque partie manifesta cependant quatre genres de problèmes internes semblables dans  la formation de politiques 
arctiques: 1) intérêts autochtones contre intérêts non autochtones; 2) intérêts régionaux contre intérêts centraux; 3) intérêts publics contre intérêts privés; 
4) intérêts de l’industrie pétrolifkre contre intérêts de chasse et de pêche commerciales et de subsistance. On suggéra en conclusion du forum que les 
prochaines réunions utilisent le Rapport Tener ou du Bureau fédéral d’examen des Bvaluations environnementales comme source de mesures de 
coopération possibles entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis dans la région de la mer de Beaufort et aussi que l’entente  entre le Canada et le Danemark serve de 
modèle possible pour la coopération environnementale du Canada et des Etats-Unis dans  l’Arctique. 
Mots clés: souverainete, passage du Nord-Ouest, droits autochtones, pétrole et  gaz, sécurité, Rapport Tener, industrialisation de l’Arctique, coopération ~- 
scientifique, mer de Beaufort, ressources marines 
Traduit pour le journal par Maurice Guibord. 
NEED FOR U.S.-CANADIAN DIALOGUE 
Technology transforms human affairs - even in the Arctic 
(Young, 1985-86). As  the  means  of exploring and exploiting 
arctic nonliving  and living resources improve, the range, scope 
and intensity of human intervention in the Arctic increases, 
altering the balance of human communities and ecosystems. 
The effects, however,  go well  beyond the physical and socio- 
logical transformations of the region. There is significant poten- 
tial  impact  upon the economies of  the states involved, as  well as 
those with whom they are associated in the world political 
economy. Most important, the political relationship between 
the geographically contiguous states suffers when each pursues 
strategies exclusive  to  itself or at least different from  those of its 
neighbor. 
Because  Canada  and the United States not infrequently seem 
to  pursue  different  goals in the Arctic, the region  has become 
something of  an irritant in U.S.-Canadian relations. With in- 
creasing interest  demonstrated  on  both sides of the border in the 
extraction of  resources from the Arctic, and  the growing  impor- 
tance of the Arctic as a strategic military region (Critchley, 
1984), the  problem  threatens to get worse  and  become a  cause of 
serious dissension. For this reason, arctic policy  should concern 
citizens and  governments  in  both countries. 
The governments  of  Canada  and  the  United States in  recent 
years  have  taken official actions  in  the  Arctic that more often 
than not have either baffled or exasperated the other party. 
There has  been confrontation on  a significant list of issues - 
jurisdiction over  marine  transportation  in the so-called North- 
west Passage, boundary delimitation in the Beaufort Sea, con- 
trol measures  on  transboundary  pollution problems, the applica- 
bility of multilaterally agreed standards, the future of joint 
development projects, e.g., the Alaska  Natural Gas  Transporta- 
tion System  (ANGST), and  whether  native rights are matters 
wholly  subject to domestic jurisdiction or whether  they  have a 
transboundary dimension. The most publicly noted of these 
problems  were  the “incidents” that  occurred  when U.S. flag 
vessels  the S . S .  Manhattan in 1969 and the U.S.C.G. PoZarSea 
in 1985 transited the Northwest Passage without requesting 
permission  from  the  Canadian government. 
Unfortunately,  government-to-government egotiations tend 
to  be a process  of positional maneuvering - that is,  Govern- 
ment A examines its needs and interests by its own unique 
internal decision  process  and  chooses a policy or position. This 
position  or  policy  is espoused in negotiation with Government 
B. In turn, officials in Government B go through a similar 
process. Each side believes its case is factually correct and 
corresponds to its interests. Often the position is sold to its 
internal interest groups as having  been  created to take care of 
their needs. As a result, it is often difficult to shift or alter the 
position or policy if  new data are presented. It is very difficult to 
see if other positions or policies would serve the interest of  the 
client groups as well or almost as well. Finally, too often 
positions  chosen by this  process attempt to maximize the 
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interest  of  the  proposing state and usually are at best  neutral 
about  the  interests  of  the other party or, if  relations are bad, 
perhaps even hostile to those interests. Positional bargaining 
makes it difficult to discover shared, overlapping or joint 
interests,  much  less to help  in “getting to yes” (Fisher and Ury, 
1981). 
Because  positional  bargaining seems inherent in official 
negotiations,  another  form or process is useful,  particularly  in 
those  situations  with  a  history  of  conflictual  interactions  within 
a  larger  context  of  cooperation. What is needed is a  situation 
where shared, overlapping or joint interests might be  discov- 
ered, where positions are accepted as facts but where the 
emphasis is on elucidation of needs and interests and where 
representatives of the  interested  groups  can explore new  infor- 
mation or interpretations  without  compromising  their  position. 
In short, what  is  needed  is  a  private forum sponsored  by  a  party 
or parties well regarded by all major interested groups and 
governments. 
THE U.S.-CANADA ARCTIC  POLICY  FORUM 
The purpose  of  the U.S.-Canada Arctic  Policy Forum was to 
provide  a  private  setting to air some public problems between 
the two countries. The hope was that such dialogue might 
identify  new  ideas or approaches  that  would  assist  in  reducing 
conflict and promote cooperation. Participants chosen were 
knowledgeable  persons  in  the  United  States and Canada from 
both  public  and  private  sectors, f om interest groups with  a  stake 
in the future of the Arctic and from academia. Since most 
participants,  especially  those  in the public  sector,  had  positions 
they were obliged to defend  if  they  attended  in  their  official 
capacities, all participants were invited to attend as private 
citizens. To promote forthrightness, the organizers promised 
participants anonymity; thus, no individual is quoted in this 
assessment of the work of the forum. But the quality of the 
dialogue is directly  proportional to  the intellectual  quality and 
arctic  experience  of the participants. As  the names and positions 
of those  listed  in  the  Appendix  indicate,  many  years  of  wisdom 
and  experience  were  available. 
The idea of a forum for  the purpose  of  seeking  new  ideas for 
resolving U.S .-Canadian  arctic  problems  originated  with James 
Zumberge, glaciologist,  president,  University  of  Southern  Cali- 
fornia, and subsequent to  the meeting  of  the forum chairman, 
U.S. Arctic Research Commission. The William H. Donner 
Foundation,  Incorporated,  of  New York, financially  supported 
the forum after  Robert  Friedheim  and  Michael Fry of  USC and 
Harriet  Critchley,  University of Calgary, agreed to organize it 
as  a  binational effort. 
What follows  is  not  a  neutral  report. The Proceedings  (1984) 
accomplishes that task. What I have tried to do - as fair- 
mindedly as possible - is  to report  my  impressions  of  what was 
said and, even less  neutral,  what was meant by many speakers. 
In sum, I have made judgments. Judgments  display  biases. I 
must  admit to being  biased  not only by  my citizenship, but also 
by  my  status as an academic, as  a former researcher for  the U . S . 
government on law  of the sea matters  and finally, as  my  Alaskan 
friends  might  point out, by  my  nonresidence in the  Arctic. 
CONFLICT  PATTERNS ON ARCTIC  PROBLEMS 
In  the two days of  discussions  certain  themes  stood out, with 
many  variations. The main themes were  striking and there was  a 
discernible difference in the general approaches of the two 
national groups. After  an initial session to get the discussions 
going, the binational group broke up  into national caucuses. 
Each  caucus  report  was  very  different  in  style  and substance. 
The Canadian spokesperson reported in detail on the sub- 
stance  of the discussions  within  the  Canadian  group: 
The  Canadian  group . . . triedto  identify  the  core  interests of 
Canada in the Arctic. Any further development of these  core 
ideas  would  require  the  establishment  of  priorities  and  timing. 
The  group  rapidly  came to the  conclusion  that  for  Canada the 
Arctic  was a  conceptual  problem.  It  was  a  whole that was  not 
easily divided.  Canada’s  interest  was  an  integrated  one.  First, 
Canada  was  concerned  with  integration of northerners  into the 
Canadian economy and society.  Related to this was a second 
core  interest  of  treating  the  problems  of  resources,  environment 
and people as a synthesis whose elements are closely inter- 
twined.  It  was  thought  that U.S.  interests  in  the  Arctic  were  not 
as  thoroughly  integrated.  A  third  important  core  interest  was  the 
maintenance  of  traditional  lifestyles  in  the  North. 
On a  fourth  area - resources - the  Canadian  group  empha- 
sized the importance of developing arctic resources in the 
interest  of  Canadians,  especially  in  the  light  of  the  previously 
mentioned  concern  for  the  maintenance  of  traditional  lifestyles. 
It  was  assumed  by  the  Canadian  group  that  resources  automati- 
cally included transportation. But which companies produce 
which resources, and therefore which transport mode they 
chose,  will  be  more  up to chance  and  economics  than to a  public 
policy  decision. 
Another  aspect  of  the  resource  interest  is  the  resource itself, 
particularly establishing the extent of the resource. Canada 
needs this information to establish the timing and pace of 
development. 
Canadians view the development of arctic technology as a 
core  interest  because  it  is  viewed  as  an  aspect  of  the  development 
of Canadian  high  technology.  Canadians  wish  to  get  away  from 
heavy  dependence on natural  resource  exports.  High  technology 
is  viewed  as a way  out of the traditional  self-portrait of being 
hewers of wood and haulers of water. Employment spinoffs 
from  arctic  development  in  the  Canadian  south  as  well  as  north  is 
viewed  as  a  core  interest.  For  resource  development  as  a  whole, 
domestic  policy  issues  have a much  higher  priority  for  Canadi- 
ans  than  perhaps  for  Americans.  Thus  the  boundary  dispute  in 
the  Beaufort  Sea  is  seen  as  one  of  the  least  important  issues. 
Canadian  oil  and  gas  people  claim  they  have  plenty of lease areas 
to  explore  before  the  question  of  the  disputed  area  must  come  up 
for  resolution. 
One  issue  which  might  come  up  for  transnational  discussion  is 
the difference  in  the  regulatory  process.  Canada nd the United 
States  require  different  data.  Moreover,  they can put  different 
interpretations on the data. There are a number of important 
issues  to  resolve  here. 
Marine  resources  per  se  are  best  discussed  under  the  heading 
of  environmental  and  social  questions  because  Canadians see 
marine  resource  development in the  context  of  adequate  marine 
environmental  protection.  Thus,  an  important  question  to  raise 
at  the  forum  is  what  measures  do  we  have  in  place  in  Canada and 
the  United  States  to  protect  the  marine  environment?  For  exam- 
ple,  a  case  can  be  made  for  the  movement of Canadian  high 
arctic  oil  to  Japan  going  west  rather  than  east.  There  should  be  an 
interface between social impacts, marine mammals and fish 
stocks  with  the  native  peoples’  concerns.  However,  land  claims 
which  are  matters  of  domestic  concern  for  both  countries  should 
not  be  part  of  the  transnational  discussions. 
Security  was  mentioned  as a  core  interest.  There  is  an  impor- 
tant  distinction  between  the  U.S.  and  Canadian  views  of  secur- 
ity. For the United States, national security usually refers to 
relations  with  one  country,  the  USSR. In the  Canadian  view, 
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national  security  in  the  Arctic  refers  to  a  number  of  arctic  littoral 
states  and  otherwise.  Moreover,  in  the  Canadian  view,  there  is 
an  environmental  component  to  its  national  security  interests  in 
the  Arctic.  Canada  is  concerned  that  marine  pollution  problems 
might  become  potential  threats  to the peace and good  order of the 
region.  This is consistent  with  the  fact  that  in  Canada,  foreign 
policy basically serves domestic needs. In the United States, 
because  it  is a superpower,  foreign  policy  serves U.S. needs in 
the  global  environment.  [Proceedings, 1984.1 
The American group used its time  in  a  very  different  manner. 
After  extended  discussion on the  nature  of U.S. interests  in  the 
Arctic, the group made an attempt to identify the issues on 
which a purely national set of decisions would probably be 
ineffective  and  where  perhaps  there are some shared interests 
between the United States and Canada. It was decided by 
consensus to put the group’s conclusions into the following 
statement: 
Canada  and  the  United  States  should  exert  joint  leadership to 
the  solution  of  the  problems  of the Arctic  that  reflect  the  mutual 
interest of  both  countries.  These  solutions  preferably  should  be 
sought  in an appropriate  cooperative  mechanism. 
The  approach of Article 234 -that  the  Arctic  is a special  zone 
- is  acceptable in principle. 
In developing  arctic  resources,  we  need  common  approaches 
to  the  eastward  and  westward  passage to or  from  the  Beaufort 
Sea  area.  With  these  must  come  early  consideration  of  issues 
that  can  best  be  dealt  with  bilaterally  or  multilaterally. 
These  might  include: 
1) bowhead  whales 
2) the  habitat  of  northern  peoples 
3) protection of the  ecosystem 
4) scientific  interestdresearch 
[Proceedings, 1984.1 
The  U.S. spokesperson  explained  that  although t e American 
group had  basic  national concerns, it preferred to seek common 
grounds for cooperation on subjects of mutual concern. What 
the American group hoped the forum would achieve was an 
agreed  statement  of  principles. 
So much for separating  positions from interests. The caucus 
statements are a  reminder  that  positions  are  developed from the 
perceptions of the  decision  makers  concerning  a  given  situation. 
While the position they choose may not be the only way to 
promote  a  favorable  outcome for  the decision maker, if he or she 
is competent, it  is one way  of  promoting  a  favorable outcome. 
Moreover, central to the  perception  of the situation  are  not  only 
the facts  of the particular case, but the general  context  in  which 
the case is viewed. 
The context  in  many  aspects  of  U.S.-Canadian  relations is 
that of  a  superpower  with  approximately  ten times the popula- 
tion  sharing the continent  with  a state with  a larger land mass, a 
separate  history,  a  dependent economy and a “North” that is 
part  of its national  myth and consciousness. The less powerful 
attempting to avoid the embrace of the more powerful is a 
common behavior  pattern in asymmetrical  situations  in  interna- 
tional politics ( D o h  and Tomlin, 1984) - even where the 
embrace is well  meant  (and  that  assumption is always closely 
examined  by  the  less  powerful!). On the  other hand, the more 
powerful  state  will  usually have multiple  interests and obliga- 
tions, broader  geographic reach, and be less able to isolate the 
problems of a particular region from its general obligations, 
even if it  is conscious  of the importance  of  not  smothering its 
less  powerful  friends (a necessity  of U.S.  foreign’policy some- 
times  thought  lacking  by some U.S. friends). 
R.L. FRIEDHEIM 
Canada’s  approach to the Arctic is overtly  nationalistic. What 
most  Canadians  have  believed for some time  is “that the Arctic 
above the Canadian land mass up to  the North Pole is, quite 
simply, Canadian . . .” (Kirton, 1984).  That has meant that, in 
several steps over time, the Canadian government has made 
sovereignty  claims to northern  waters  that  the U.S. government 
has never  conceded are subject to any  state’s  sovereignty. That 
is the core issue in the North between the United States and 
Canada. It is an emotional issue, indeed a symbolic issue, 
especially in Canada, though it does strike some emotional 
responses from the South. While I believe my description of 
Canadian behavior  will  pass  muster under any  definition drawn 
from the literature on nationalism (Kohn, 1955), it is often 
assumed  that such a  description  if  given  by  an  American has 
prescriptive  overtones. It would  be  difficult for me to deny  that 
possibility  considering the  fact  that I was trained  in  the 
McDougalian  tradition  that I shall invoke below. 
While the  U.S. opening  statement sounds - and  was  intended 
to be - conciliatory,  it  does  not concede the one fundamental 
goal the  Canadians  assembled  desired from Americans:  sover- 
eignty over the  water  areas  in  question. Nor did  it  indicate ven a 
willingness to discuss  sovereignty.  In effect, the  United  States 
group said it thought  the U.S. government  would  be  forthcom- 
ing  about  increased  Canadian  control of activities  in the Cana- 
dian  200-mile  exclusive  economic zone, since  coastal states are 
entitled to special treatment in ice-covered areas to prevent 
“irreversible  disturbance  of  the  ecological balance” (UNCLOS 
Treaty, 1982:  Article  234). 
The United States position, if less “nationalistic,” was no 
less calculated to foster the U.S. national interest than the 
Canadian  position  was to foster theirs. Since as  a superpower - 
a  hegemon (Keohane, 1984) - the  United  States  is  concerned 
about its worldwide  reach  by sea and air, it has feared “enclo- 
sure” moves that would threaten its strategic mobility,  espe- 
cially  through straits. Since the  Truman  Proclamation  in  1945 
claimed for the United States rights over the “continental 
shelf,” the U.S. government  has  been  ambivalent  about  mari- 
time claims. On the.one hand, the United States has encour- 
aged “enclosure” for resource  purposes; on the other hand, it 
has resisted “sovereign” forms of enclosure because of the 
potential  impact  upon the mobility of its civilians  and  military 
ships and aircraft. It has  fought  hard in many fora to prevent  the 
establishment of an adverse precedent. Canadian offers, fre- 
quently  hinted at during  the  long  history  of this controversy, to 
grant the U.S. special  status  in  its  arctic  waters  in  return for an 
admission  by  the U.S. of  Canadian  sovereignty have, thus far, 
fallen upon deaf ears. While the United States has growing 
specific interests in the Arctic for resource exploitation and 
regional  military  strategic  considerations, the cornerstone  of its 
approach is its view  of its needs  as  a  superpower. It refuses  to 
convert  what it claims to be  a  right to a  privilege. Moreover, 
some State Department lawyers take  moral comfort in  claiming 
that the United States is defending what two of the major 
American  theoreticians  of  ocean  law  characterized  as  a law of 
“inclusion,” while  viewing  what Canada wishes to  do in  the 
Arctic as an aspect of a law of “exclusion” (McDougal and 
Burke, 1962:63).  In  other words, in its own view, the United 
States  position  represents the world’s general interest. 
The brevity of the U.S. statement masked some important 
factors  concerning  the U.S. stance in the  Arctic  that  inevitably 
affect  the  way  Americans  approach  the  problems  of U.S.-Cana- 
dian relations in the Arctic. First, there is a dynamic tension 
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within  the U.S. political  system  concerning arctic policy because 
of the  relative  equality  of  strength  of  the political inputs. It is 
obvious  that in the  past  the  general great power role of the U.S. 
and the influence of the Department of Defense have been 
important  factors  in  the  positions the U.S. adopted  in the Arctic. 
They are still important today. Indeed, with the limited but 
alarming information available about under-ice operations of 
Soviet submarines - especially those armed with nuclear 
missiles - and the difficulties of conducting antisubmarine 
warfare in ice-covered areas (Le  Marchand,  1985), it is very 
likely  that  the  Department of Defense  will continue to have a 
major  voice in U. S.  arctic policy. What changes will occur if the 
Department  of  Defense  perceives  an  increased threat to U.S. 
security  that  might be initiated  from  the  Arctic  was difficult to 
discuss at  the  forum  given the limited  information available and 
therefore  was  masked over. 
What makes the situation dynamic is that the Arctic has 
become  increasingly  important  to the United States for resource 
purposes  and  that the political  voice  of its spokespersons has 
become  both louder and  more often heard. Alaska is no longer 
the least populated  of  the  fifty  United States. It  now  has over 
521 000 people. To be sure, only a relatively small  percentage 
live  above  the  Arctic Circle, but a substantial percentage depend 
for their livelihood  on  resource exploitation above the Arctic 
Circle. Forty  to fifty percent of known U. S.  domestic reserves 
of oil  and  gas are in  the  Arctic (National  Petroleum  Council, 
1981). Enormous investments in the arctic oil pipeline and 
marine  terminal facilities have  been made. Even  if the North is 
not  part  of  the U.S. national myth, the United States is increas- 
ingly conscious of its arctic assets  and problems. 
Alaska  has a significant political  voice in the U.S. political 
system. It  seems to me  that  some  of our  Canadian  colleagues at 
the forum misunderstood the importance of Alaska in U.S. 
politics because  Alaskans  at  the forum complained so loud  and 
long  about U.S. government  neglect or even mischief. Never- 
theless, Alaska  has  two senators with seniority and a  congress- 
man of the  president’s  party  in Washington. If Alaska does not 
get all it wants, or  its  citizens still feel  they are geographically 
separated outsiders, they are heard. 
The common complaint is fragmentation in the decision 
process  on  arctic issues in  the  United States. While true, it is 
also true  of a number  of  other areas of policy concern in  the 
United States, for example in  Ocean policy generally (Hoole et 
a f . ,  198 1). Fragmentation  may  still exist, but numerous efforts 
to  understand  the  problems  and propose solutions have  been  and 
are  being  made  by  in-house studies within the federal govern- 
ment  (Interagency Arctic Research  Policy Committee,  1985), 
by state agencies (Scientific Advisory Commission,  1985), the 
National  Academies of Science  andEngineering (Polar Research 
Board, 1985), Congress (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1985)  and a presidentially  appointed Arctic Research Commis- 
sion (U.S. Arctic  Research Commission, 1986). 
Finally, Alaska and Alaskans are increasingly being inte- 
grated into the life of the lower 48 states. It  may  be occurring 
willy nilly, and  some  complain  that the policies chosen are  not 
appropriate and that Alaskans - especially the indigenous 
people - will pay dearly for the changes wrought (Berger, 
1986), but  the  Alaska  of  today is significantly different from the 
Alaska prior to the shipment of the first oil south  from Prudhoe 
Bay.  The  U.S. is further along in arctic “industrialization” than 
Canada, and it is further along  in concluding the status of the 
indigenous people  by  integrating them into a capitalist econ- 
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omy.  The key  question is not  what  basic  steps  the U.S. should 
take, but  how effectively those steps already  taken will work. If 
the  Alaska  Native  Claims Settlement Act is not amended, we 
may  know after 1991  when  native lands  deeds become eligible 
for potential  resale (Yarrow, 1985). 
The  participants  at  the  Arctic  Forum  agreed to isagree about 
sovereignty  issues  and  get  on  with forum business. This was 
good enough for forum purposes. Agreeing to disagree also 
seemed to be  good  enough  to keep arctic problems from 
becoming a major  source of dissension  in U.S  .-Canadian rela- 
tions until  the  Canadian  government  in  response to the Polar 
Sea “incident” invoked a straight  baseline concept for defining 
Canada’s  Arctic  Ocean border. The effect of enabling legisla- 
tion  was  to create, as  of 1 January  1986,  a baseline for Canada’s 
territorial sea  by  drawing a straight line connecting the  head- 
lands of the outmost islands of the Canadian archipelago. 
Everything  within  would  become  the internal waters  of Canada, 
possibly  subjecting all who  would enter to Canada’s  sovereign 
control (Territorial Sea Geographic  Coordinates: Area 7 Order, 
P.C. 1985-2739). At this stage, agreeing to disagree will no 
longer  work. 
Another striking aspect of the forum was the similarity of 
general structural problems  both  sides faced in the formulation 
of  domestic arctic policies. Both countries are subject  to “cross- 
cutting cleavages” (Axelrod, 1969), that is, the stakeholders 
are pulling  in different directions, making  it difficult to have a 
single coherent thrust to policy. The accents were slightly differ- 
ent, but  the  complaints  on  both sides of the  border  on  northern 
policy  sounded  remarkably  similar.  Four  patterns  were 
discernible: 1) native vs. non-native interests; 2) regional vs. 
central interests; 3) public vs. private interests; and 4) oil devel- 
opment vs. subsistence  and  commercial fishing and hunting. 
Who are the appropriate  beneficiaries  of “sound” policies in 
the Arctic - all  who  live there, or the  native peoples? Who 
should  make the decisions  that affect their lives? Both  Canadian 
and  American speakers felt that  the  native peoples should  be 
involved  as  much  as  possible  in their own  governance.  Some 
even suggested that  the  indigenous  people  should  be involved in 
the analysis  of scientific data. Indeed, the question  was raised as 
to whether the interests of the native peoples were properly 
represented at the forum, since, although native participants 
were invited, none  was able to attend (the science advisor of  the 
North Slope Borough attended in the place of the invited 
mayor). 
As  we  have seen, the  Alaskan participants were vocal about 
where decisions relating to the future  of the Arctic should be 
made - in the North or in the national capital. Canadian 
representatives were  more  polite  about Ottawa, but the message 
was  similar: the center exercised  too heavy a hand  on  regional 
governance. 
Public regulatory  needs  and  private  market uncertainties also 
affected  both sides. What  was  needed  to control the “industrial- 
ization” of  the  North?  Many  opinions  were xpressed  but here 
were no  “national” positions  espoused  by either side concern- 
ing the problems  of  implementation. Some of these uncertain- 
ties  arose from the fact that  many of the  key decisions relating to 
the development of the Arctic  will  be  made  by  the private sector. 
For  example, there  was considerable discussion as to whether 
Canadian arctic oil companies were interested in exploring the 
possibility  of  shipping crude to a  Far Eastern  market  via ships 
moving  through the Bering Strait. This was characterized as a 
“prospect.” Much depends upon the size of the finds. Smaller 
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and  more  remote finds may  require  a  marine  method to get  the 
product to market. But  that  market also may  be eastern Canada, 
Europe or the eastern United States. If  a major find is  made  in 
the  Mackenzie Delta, a  pipeline  might  make  more sense. But 
until  private  decisions  are made, it is difficult to predict what 
regulatory needs there will be, although there were strong 
preferences expressed, especially by  the  North Slope Borough 
representative, for having regulations in place before marine 
transportation  of  arctic oil occurs. 
The question of development was  an emotional issue  on  both 
sides. The boom-and-bust impacts of oil exploitation on the 
native  peoples  were  contrasted  with preservation of their subsis- 
tence lifestyle. The cash economy inevitably changes living 
patterns, health  and  values. There was also considerable discus- 
sion as to whether questions relating to the rights of native 
peoples  were  a  proper subject of a  transnational forum, since 
these, in a legal sense, are matters wholly within domestic 
jurisdiction. Other speakers  pointed out that even if this  were so 
legally, the native peoples themselves have organized on a 
trilateral  basis (Canada-U. S .-Greenland) in  the Inuit Circumpo- 
lar Conference and that any hope of treating native rights issues 
entirely on a  national  basis  was  doomed from the start. 
It seemed to me that, despite significant national differences 
in emphasis and detail, a  number  of speakers from both  arctic 
nations were united in their concern that domestically the 
decision  process  was fragmented, there  were  too  many stake- 
holders pulling  in  too  many opposing directions and there was 
insufficient  attention  within  the  nation as a  whole to the role the 
Arctic should play  in  their  national system. In sum, policy  was 
not well centered, was “weak,” or at least inadequate for 
addressing the problems. 
U.S.-CANADA COOPERATION  ON  ARCTIC PROBLEMS 
Although at a  transnational  forum there is rarely  a single time 
wken concerns about  maintaining the integrity  of one’s position 
become  transformed into a concern for maximizing one’s 
national benefits through cooperation, the participants at the 
forum did make  that transition. Yet even in discussion of  how 
both  could  mutually benefit, the language of cooperation was 
first  scrutinized to see what  might have been meant. 
Canadians asked what the American group meant in its 
statement by the phrases “joint leadership” and “common 
approaches.” After considerable discussion most participants 
were content with  the explanation that no specific arrangement 
was  intended but rather  that  in the discussion of  arctic problems 
with transnational aspects the two countries might view the 
problems in the following roughly established hierarchy. 
At  the lowest level we  could be concerned with information 
interchange. There are gaps in information needed by both 
countries that might  be  filled  more effectively by developing 
new  patterns  of information exchange. 
At  the next level, we  could  be concerned with active coopera- 
tion on certain matters. In particular, there was concern 
expressed about the  possibility that we might develop divergent 
regulatory requirements on exploitation of natural resources, 
environmental management  and marine transportation that 
would  disaccommodate or even harm the other. While  many  of 
these  matters  are  within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the 
parties, their actions may  have transnational impacts. Coopera- 
tion  in  this case would  require an effort to coordinate our legally 
separate actions. 
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Finally, there  was  discussion  of “joint management,” which, 
while  not  defined precisely, seemed to mean  a system of 
decision  that  required  mutual consent, probably  on those prob- 
lems that  have  significant  transnational impact, and  where  the 
two governments may  have  a de facto veto over the  action  of  the 
other if its consent is not secured. Both sides were comfortable 
with  the first two  levels - information interchange and coordi- 
nation - but the Canadian group, while willing to listen to 
discussions of “joint management,”  wanted it  understood  that 
they  were  not  committed to its pursuit. 
Several  speakers  from  both countries pointed out that  while 
we  extolled  the  idea  of  information exchange across our com- 
mon border, it  is  already proceeding - and at a  rapid rate - 
within industry. A  Canadian  pointed out that there  is  a  common 
interest  in developing arctic technology. The  same challenges 
face industry in both national “norths.” Moreover, multina- 
tional enterprises  have  interests  on  both sides of the border, and 
it  is  a  common  practice to transfer technology. He thought it 
ironic that there was probably less information exchange 
government-to-government  than  was  already  taking place within 
the  private sector. 
A  number  of  speakers emphasized the  need for better links on 
arctic research, certainly in exchanging information and per- 
haps in active coordination of projects. Both sides perceived 
weaknesses in  the  use of scientific data in domestic governmen- 
tal decision making. Duplication  of effort in  a  high-cost envi- 
ronment is perennially a matter of concern. Whatever the 
outcome of the jurisdictional questions, if marine transport 
systems that function well in the Arctic are to be developed, 
whoever makes the rules needs data to require or regulate 
routing, provide  an  ice forecast, emplace buoys and other 
navigational aids, develop regulations to prevent, clean up  or 
otherwise mitigate spills and compensate those harmed by 
pollution  and coordinate the actions  of coast guards on regula- 
tion enforcement and search and rescue. For regulatory pur- 
poses generally both governments need extensive sets of baseline 
data. 
A  Canadian  indicated that the idea  of cooperation on science 
was not a problem, but joint funding, data sharing and the 
provision  of joint scientific  services could be  a  problem-  of the 
most pragmatic sort. Commitments are needed to coordinate 
data gathering, maintain  common data standards and provide a 
reliable stream of funding. This is difficult enough within a 
single system, much more difficult when two systems must 
respond in similar fashion. However, the opportunities are 
there. He noted that in the Beaufort Sea the currents, and  the 
potential pollution, flow from east to west. What  is  needed  are 
data from agencies on  both sides of the border that are compar- 
able. Another area where cooperation is needed is on ice 
information, particularly offshore wind effects, needed for 
navigational safety. LANDSAT images would  be essential for 
this task, but the U.S. facility  in Fairbanks that can do real-time 
analysis is underutilized. On the other hand, Canada has the 
facilities to do more sophisticated analyses. Joint funding and 
joint activities on satellite research might have a significant 
payoff for both countries. 
All participants recognized the political and bureaucratic 
impediments. Cooperation that will lead to useful results requires 
formal structures to help in the transfer of information. Formal 
structures - real organizations - need  real budgets and  real 
budget allocations. It was difficult for any participant to propose 
a  particular cooperative organization in the light of the financial 
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constraints of  recent times. Yet precisely  because  of  the  reduc- 
tion of the  fortunes  of  the  oil  industry  in a world  market  awash 
with oil, it makes sense not  only  to  reduce  the cost of environ- 
mental  regulation  through  cooperation  in  the acquisition of the 
necessary environmental data, but possibly also for the oil 
industries  and  geological surveys to cooperate to  reduce  pros- 
pecting costs. Existing cooperative mechanisms  have  been 
limited by subject  matter  and budget. Approximately  every  18 
months  over  the  last  ten years, a Subcommittee on Science and 
Technology of the  Canadian  Advisory  Committee  on  Northern 
Development has met with its American counterpart. For  the 
most part the subject has been science related. A Canadian 
reported  that  the  agencies  concerned  have felt that, at best, the 
meetings  have  been  useful  to  give  advanced warnings of  prob- 
lems or indicate  where  some  form  of j int action is appropriate. 
At worst, the  meetings  have  been  useful as safety valves. 
Despite  the  concern  that  there  are  myriad  problems  of  native 
peoples of the North finding a place in  the  modern  world  where 
they  can  take  advantage of the  material  benefits of being citizens 
of  an industrial  society  without  giving  up  their culture, it  was 
recognized  that  these  are  problems  wholly  within  the domestic 
jurisdiction of the  states concerned. As the forum progressed 
there  was  an  increasing  recognition  that  both  the  United States 
and  Canada face similar problems. As I mentioned, the United 
States has already implemented some forms of settlement of 
native claims. These may  be changed, but it is  unlikely the U.S. 
will reverse its  course completely.  Nevertheless, we can learn 
from  each other. Moreover, the Inuit themselves organized in 
the  Circumpolar  Conference  will force comparisons. 
Perhaps  it  was  this  awareness  that  both governments will  be 
subject  to  pressures  from  the native peoples  of the North  that 
made a number of Canadians and Americans look favorably 
upon the idea of cooperation  in  providing  health services for the 
indigenous people. Another  factor  might  have  been the distinc- 
tive health problems of people in isolated communities and 
settlements or the costs of providing health services. In any 
case, the  participants  thought  this  was a potential area of  need 
where  cooperation  might  have payoffs. 
The most  obvious  rationale for cooperative efforts at the first 
two levels of  interaction discussed, information exchange and 
coordination, and  perhaps  even at the  third level of joint efforts, 
is  that  some of the  problems  have transboundary  impacts. In 
short, it  is  virtually  impossible to confine the effects of  human 
use and natural processes to a politically defined geographic 
area. This is most  evident  where  the area concerned exhibits the 
characteristics of a natural common. Where  water flows regard- 
less of  manmade law, it is impossible  to  insist  that pollutants, 
fish  and other positive  and  negative  amenities remain on  one 
side of the border. Even  on land, where  we are accustomed to 
thinking  of fences as nonpermeable, in the Arctic fences virtu- 
ally do not exist. Moreover, at the present stage  of development 
no one  considers it desirable to try to constrain the migration of 
the  caribou or the  wanderings of polar bears. Finally, it seemed 
to  me  that  there  was a general awareness that, if each  country 
chose to maximize  only  its  short-run benefit without  regard to 
the other, it might  be  possible to suffer a common disaster, a 
tragedy  of  the  commons (Hardin, 1968). 
The regions  of the two countries that share a common border 
feel most immediately the problems that arise from the area 
being  treated as a  common. They have powerful incentives to 
cooperate, as the delegates to the forum  recognized. An  Ameri- 
can noted  that there were  already functioning scientist-to- 
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scientist relationships between scientists in Alaska and the 
Northwest Territories. Although  they are working well, hope 
was  expressed  that he forum  could  help  in cementing these ties 
in the future. 
Cooperation is most needed, as almost all at the forum 
recognized, in the area of the Beaufort Sea. On the American 
side of the  border  it is already “industrialized” and  its native 
people  have  already felt the  impact  of a market economy. They 
have  their own form  of  local self-government, the  North Slope 
Borough, which just prior to  the convening of the forum was 
going  through  political  turmoil  with a bitterly contested elec- 
tion. Its  people  fear  that further exploitation of oil  and  gas  and 
any  resultant  pollution or the use  of  tankers  to bring  product to 
market  may interfere with  the  migration of the bowhead whale, 
the taking of which they claim is critical to their cultural 
identity. Their nervousness  on questions of  marine transporta- 
tion will require answers from both American, and if the 
“prospect” of the movement  of  Canadian  oil  to  Asian  markets 
becomes a probability or reality, Canadian authorities. 
At  the  time  the  forum  was meeting, hopes  were high but there 
was  little  information  about  whether a major oil pool existed in 
the Canadian Beaufort Sea. The hopes apparently have been 
justified with a find by Gulf Canada Ltd. at its 1-65 well at 
Amauligak, which has been calculated to have reserves of 
700-800 million  barrels (Wall Street Journal, 1986). Many of 
the problems that will be encountered have counterparts in 
American experience. Moreover, Alaskans are anticipating that 
if any difficulties are encountered because the currents run  from 
east to  west  in  the  Beaufort Sea, they  will  not  remain exclusively 
Canadian difficulties. Even if Canadian authorities manage 
through  wise  policies  to  avoid  all  or  most  of  the  feared difficul- 
ties, all interested parties  on  both sides of the border  want  to  feel 
assured  as  much  in  advance  as possible. 
The Canadian  group  at the forum  indicated  that a  Canadian 
study group had  already done most  of the work  necessary to be 
reasonably  confident  that  in the implementation  stage the Cana- 
dian  government  can  provide  such assurances. A federal assess- 
ment  panel  had  already  reviewed  many  of  the  key questions 
related  to development. It looked at  both submarine pipeline and 
ship options for Dome, Esso and Gulf. It assessed tanker 
designs, safety and  navigation questions, management  of  ship 
traffic, oil spill responsibility and impact upon people and 
animals. The report, often called the Tener Report after its 
chairman, John S.  Tener, identified a need for a single authority 
in  the  Beaufort  Sea  to  manage oil spill cleanups. It also 
identified  some  areas of potential bilateral cooperation.  These 
include the ice  regime  in the Beaufort Sea, meteorology (the 
engine driving the  weather system), the biology  of the Beaufort 
Sea (fish populations, food chains, etc.), safety of ship passage 
and  modeling of the  weather  system (so that it will  be possible to 
design better spill cleanup systems). The panel  recommended 
that there be no tanker traffic until all of the problems  have been 
thoroughly  researched (Federal Environmental  Assessment 
Panel, 1984). 
It was suggested that the Tener Report  be  used as the basis for 
a future meeting  of the U.S.-Canada Arctic Forum. It  would 
allow a binational group  to focus  on some  of the key problems of 
the Beaufort  Sea  region  in a structured manner.  The  suggestion 
was  greeted  with enthusiasm because there is no  comparable 
document on the American side. While there have been many 
scientific studies of the Beaufort Sea - a huge library of 
environmental assessments  was  compiled before leasing in U. S .  
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federal waters - there  was  no study that  focused on the broad 
policy questions relating to exploitation and  movement  of oil 
and  its impact on  the  people  and  biota  of  the region. Neverthe- 
less, the raw  materials  are  available  at  the  Arctic Environmental 
Information  and  Data Center of  the  University  of Alaska. 
Although  there  was  considerable concurrence  between parti- 
cipants, whatever their nationality, on  the  nature  of the substan- 
tive problems in the  Arctic  that  both countries must solve, either 
separately or together, we struggled to find a process of interac- 
tion  that  would  satisfy  both sides. One  suggestion  was to look 
for a  “model” regime  that  has  been  applied elsewhere in similar 
circumstances that  might  provide a useful  basis  of comparison. 
An American  suggested  that  perhaps in the future we  could 
examine the  Canada-Denmark  Agreement concerning the envi- 
ronmental issues in the waters that separate Greenland and 
Canada to determine  whether  there are some  useful precedents. 
The  agreement  includes provisions for the exchange of scien- 
tific information, cooperation on pollution prevention, vessel 
routing, compensation for damages and cleanup costs, access to 
each other’s vessels  and  the specification of the geographic area 
covered. In addition, a dispute settlement procedure was estab- 
lished (Agreement between . . . , 1984). 
The suggestion  was  greeted  with  general enthusiasm. It 
seemed to me that, in part, the positive response  was due to the 
fact that  the  suggestion  somewhat assuaged an earlier concern as 
to  whether  we  could  look at arctic problems - some of  which 
are  generic  to  the  region - in a strictly U.S.-Canadian context, 
since  there are other players in the region. One of the expressed 
concerns  was  the  possibility of development of regulations on a 
national level that  would  be so idiosyncratic as to frustrate a user 
of arctic waters, such  as a ship captain who  might  have to obey a 
series of contradictory regulations on a continuous voyage 
through  waters  regulated  by  two or more states. If Canada  and 
Denmark  have  come  to a satisfactory  resolution  of some of these 
problems, it would  argue for a  broader application of some  of 
the  required practices. 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
I believe  most  participants left the meeting  with the feeling 
that  the  several days we spent together  were  worth their time. 
We  did  not  resolve  any  major  problem  in US.-Canadian arctic 
relations, but  then  as  an  informal  study group we realized that 
we  were  not  empowered to do that. We tried to express honest 
opinions, inform each other of what we thought about the 
problems and  introduce a few new,  innovative ideas. 
The major  value  of the meeting  was  to sketch  out an  agenda 
for future informal and, perhaps further in the future, more 
formal U. S .-Canadian interactions in the Arctic. We discovered 
that  we are both  concerned  about the future of development in 
the Arctic, especially in the Beaufort Sea. We believe that a 
thorough  examination of the transnational problems that  will 
arise from the  further  development  of  the Beaufort  Sea region 
and the patterns  of transnational cooperation  needed, at least at 
the level of information exchange and coordination of our 
separate policies, if not joint management, is a priority item. 
We hope  to  be  able to tackle  these matters in a future forum. We 
also believe we can learn to coordinate by example. Thus, 
another priority item would be a session that will consider 
whether the Canada-Denmark agreement has worked, and if so, 
how  well  it  has  worked  and  how generalizable its rules might  be 
to other areas of the Arctic. 
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We also reinforced our existing awareness of how difficult it 
is  to  cope  with  problems on which states have  chosen positions. 
We  were able to  work  around  the jurisdictional questions, but 
we could  not  ignore them. Unfortunately  neither  could our two 
states. Nevertheless, whatever  the  outcome of the jurisdictional 
quarrels, other problems  remain  that  must  be  solved if the arctic 
states of the North  American  continent are to maximize their 
long-run interests in wise use of the resource rich, sparsely 
settled and environmentally fragile North. We hope that we 
have  helped in focusing  attention  on  the  nature of those interests 
and  on  some of the  means for maximizing them. 
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